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David G. Morgan-Owen. The Fear of Invasion: Strategy, Politics, 
and British War Planning, 1880-1914. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2017. Pp. 250.
The past decade has seen a surge in the study of the British 
Empire’s grand strategy and war planning before the First World 
War. Indeed, historian Matthew Seligmann has gone so far as to 
identify the past decade as “The Renaissance of Pre-First World 
War Naval History.”1 David Morgan-Owen’s new monograph, The 
Fear of Invasion, is an excellent addition to this trend. He tackles a 
formidable objective: proving that the threat of attack on the British 
Isles had a significant influence on the formation of the British 
Empire’s pre-First World War defence policy. To the layperson, this 
may seem a simple goal but in doing so, Morgan-Owen is refuting 
over sixty years of established historiography. Despite this daunting 
goal, Morgan-Owen’s argument and use of evidence will sway both 
newcomers to defence studies as well as experienced academics.  
For over sixty years, the historiography of the United Kingdom 
before the First World War has consistently regarded the prospect 
of the British Isles being invaded, and the invasion scares of the 
pre-1914 period, as nothing more than a ‘bogey.’2 Many works treat 
the invasion issue, particularly the deliberations of the Committee 
of Imperial Defence, as purely political: the machination of Army 
officers seeking higher budgets, jingoistic conscriptionists, or even 
naval officers who sought to bend the British Army to their will.3 
Morgan-Owen identifies this gap within the historiography, arguing 
that, while political intrigue was an influence, this interpretation 
1  Matthew S. Seligmann, “The Renaissance of Pre-First World War Naval History,” 
The Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 3 (2013): 454-79.
2  The term’s use in academia is most highly attributed to Arthur J. Marder, From 
Dreadnought to Scapa Flow - The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919 - Volume 
I The Road to War, 1904-1914 (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).
3  See, for example, Franklyn Arthur Johnson, Defence by Committee: The British 
Committee of Imperial Defence 1885-1959 (London: Oxford University Press, 1960); 
Samuel R. Williamson Jr., Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare 
for War, 1904-1914 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969); Michael Howard, 
The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era 
of the Two World Wars (London: Temple Smith, 1972); Nicholas d’Ombrain, War 
Machinery and High Policy: Defence Administration in Peacetime Britain 1902-
1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973); and John Gooch, The Plans of War: 
The General Staff and British Military Strategy c. 1900-1916 (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1974).
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unjustly brands home defence as having a negligible impact on pre-
war British strategy. The historiography of British war planning 
has been overwhelmingly concerned with the formation of naval and 
military offensive war plans against Germany. Morgan-Owen argues 
that this has “created a false dichotomy between ‘Continental’ and 
‘blue water’ schools,” in which the pre-war period was defined by 
cutthroat competition for funding and operational prestige between 
the British Army and Royal Navy (p. 4).
Distancing itself from these themes, The Fear of Invasion’s 
central objective is detailing the strategic dilemmas facing the British 
Empire before the First World War. Buttressed by extensive archival 
research, Morgan-Owen argues that the United Kingdom’s pre-war 
strategic thinking was primarily defensive. The goal of British leaders 
was maintenance of the Empire and of the European status quo. In 
turn, Morgan-Owen believes this bred an “unwillingness to discuss 
offensive issues” (p. 232). The blame for this, he argues, lies with the 
pre-war political leadership who above all desired European peace, 
and if not that, hoped “sea power, financial strength, and geographical 
isolation would insulate Britain from the most immediate effects of 
a European conflict” (p. 6). Rather than coordinating the armed 
services into an effective war machine, the politicians reinforced the 
‘Continental Commitment’ of sending the British Expeditionary Force 
to the aid of France. This decision was one of political expediency 
rather than military practicality because, as Morgan-Owen argues, 
“beyond the diplomatic imperative to support France, the government 
had no concrete conception of how to fight a war against Germany” 
(p. 226).
The bulk of the book, and its strongest sections, concerns the 
growing strategic predicament faced by the Royal Navy in its war 
planning against Germany. Faced with an increasingly strategically 
divergent and reticent British Army, the bulk of defensive duties were 
thrust upon the Royal Navy. The story of the gradual withdrawal 
of the Royal Navy-planned blockade of Germany in the face of 
submarines, nautical mines and torpedo craft has frequently been told 
before, but Morgan-Owen provides the most radical account yet. Not 
only were offensive naval operations sidelined by the establishment of 
‘far blockade,’ but as early as 1906, under the leadership of dogmatic 
First Sea Lord Jackie Fisher, the fear of German attack on the British 
Isles, either purely naval or amphibious, began to dominate Royal 
Navy thinking. Drawing upon an impressive quantity of Admiralty 
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memorandum, Morgan-Owen illustrates that the reforms in fleet 
disposition and coastal patrol all geared towards combating a German 
coup de main against Great Britain’s east coast. In doing so, Morgan-
Owen refutes naval historian Andrew Lambert’s revisionist theories 
on Royal Navy ‘flotilla defence’ and strategic economic warfare.4 
Moreover, Morgan-Owen contends that the Admiralty recognised its 
impotence, and it became the primary proponent for readdressing 
the divergence in naval and military planning, although it ultimately 
failed in bringing about change before August 1914. Thus, the United 
Kingdom entered the First World War with only a set of general 
principles on defending the Empire. 
The conclusion of The Fear of Invasion is reminiscent of David 
Lloyd George’s famous quote chronicling the beginning of the First 
World War: “The nations backed their machines over the precipice… 
not one of them wanted war; certainly not on this scale.”5 David 
Morgan-Owen gives credence to Lloyd George’s claim about British 
apprehension towards war, but also illustrates that, despite its 
obligations, the British Empire did not have an effective war machine 
in August 1914. The Fear of Invasion is an important work on a 
subject that needed a modern revision. While other historians have 
been satisfied with squabbling over the minor minutiae of British 
military and naval thinking before the First World War, David 
Morgan-Owen offers an innovative and tactful account on the role of 
home defence in shaping British strategy.
alexander maavara, laurier centre for military 
strategic and disarmament studies
4  Nicholas A. Lambert, Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution (Columbia: University 
of South Carolina, 1999); and Nicholas A Lambert, Planning Armageddon: British 
Economic Warfare and the First World War (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2012).
5  David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George (London: Ivor Nicholson 
& Watson Limited, 1933), 55.
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